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In the United States electoral system, a candidate is elected indirectly by winning a majority
of electoral votes cast by individual states, the election usually being decided by the votes cast
by a small number of ”swing states” where the two candidates historically have roughly equal
probabilities of winning. The effective value of a swing state in deciding the election is determined
not only by the number of its electoral votes but by the frequency of its appearance in the set of
winning partitions of the electoral college. Since the electoral vote values of swing states are not
identical, the presence or absence of a state in a winning partition is generally correlated with the
frequency of appearance of other states and, hence, their effective values. We quantify the effective
value of states by an electoral susceptibility, χj , the variation of the winning probability with the
”cost” of changing the probability of winning state j. We study χj for realistic data accumulated
for the 2012 U.S. presidential election and for a simple model with a Zipf’s law type distribution
of electoral votes. In the latter model we show that the susceptibility for small states is largest
in ”one-sided” electoral contests and smallest in close contests. We draw an analogy to models of
entropically driven interactions in poly-disperse colloidal solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The President of the United States is indirectly elected
by the electoral college; the electoral college consists of
538 electors, with each state apportioned an amount
equal to the amount of Senators and Representatives
from that state serving in Congress. In order to win
the Presidential election, the candidate must receive at
least 270 electoral votes.
With the exception of two states (Nebraska and Maine
which apportion their votes by congressional district),
each state awards the whole sum of their electoral votes
to the candidate who wins the popular vote in that
state. Because of the discrete nature in which votes are
awarded, there are 251 ways in which the election could
go.
However, using polling data and recent election history,
we can determine with great certainty that many states
will always go Democrat or Republican. Thus, the out-
come of the election is determined by a small number of
”swing states” which poll nearly evenly for both parties.
Using recent polling data, a typical list might be: Col-
orado (9), Florida (29), Iowa (6), Michigan (16), Nevada
(6), New Hampshire (4), North Carolina (16), Ohio (18),
Virginia (13), and Wisconsin (10). (Each state is listed
with its electoral votes in parenthesis.) In this instance,
the Democratic candidate enters the swing state contest
with 221 electoral votes and the Republican with 191
votes; either candidate needs 270 votes to win the elec-
tion. Only counting these ten states, there are 210 = 1024
partitions of the electoral college.
Of the 1024 possible partitions of the swing state elec-
toral college, 741 of them achieve 49 or more electoral
votes thus leading to a Democratic victory, and 283 of
them achieve 79 or more electoral votes leading to a Re-
publican victory. The value of a state to a candidate has
not only to do with its electoral size, but its ”fit” with
other states as measured by the frequency it appears in
winning partitions. To illustrate this interaction between
states, if the Democrat loses Ohio and Florida, he can
still win the election with Michigan, Wisconsin, Virginia,
New Hampshire and Nevada or Iowa, achieving exactly
the 49 necessary votes. However, losing Virginia makes
New Hampshire, Nevada and Iowa much less valuable.
Now consider the likelihood that a specific partition
would occur, assuming pa, pb . . . are the probabilities that
the Democrat will win states a, b, . . ., and 1 − pc, 1 −
pd, . . . are the probabilities of losing state c, d, . . .. The
probability that the election follows a particular partition
(call it g) is then,
Pg = papb . . . (1− pc)(1 − pd) . . . (1)
Thus, we have a set of probabilities, {Pg}, corresponding
to the 1024 different scenarios for the outcome of the
swing states. Using this, the probability of the Democrat
winning, E, is:
E =
∑
partitions g
Pg θ(Ng −NW ) (2)
where Ng is the electoral votes awarded to the candi-
date in partition g, and NW is the number of electoral
votes the candidate needs from the swing states to win.
The unit step function, θ, restricts the sum to winning
partitions.
Given the discrete nature of the electoral college and
inhomogeneous electoral vote values, we pose the follow-
ing question: if s votes for one candidate within a par-
ticular state could be added for a set ”cost”—thereby in-
creasing the probability of winning that state—in which
state should that investment be made? [1–3] We define
this quantity by an electoral susceptibility δE/δsj which
2roughly measures the variation of the winning probability
with the probability of winning state j.
In an inhomogeneous electoral college, the removal of a
single state i affects the number of times state j appears
in the set of winning partitions. This is true in general
for any pair of states (i, j) and leads to unintuitive corre-
lations between the states. Associating entropy with the
logarithm of the number of appearances of a state within
the set of winning partitions, the entropy per state (in
effect, the chemical potential) is not additive and the
states may be said to ”interact.” Analogously to thermo-
dynamics, the susceptibility to a change in an external
parameter involves the variation of free energy with re-
spect to the parameter. Within this analogy, the free
energy cannot be written as a sum of individual particle
free energies because of interactions between the parti-
cles.
This state of affairs is closely related to the phe-
nomenon of entropically driven attraction in bi-disperse
colloidal solutions. In solution, the entropy of the small
particles depends implicitly on the coordinates of the
large particles. The entropy is then maximized by config-
urations where the large particles are close to one another
reducing the volume they exclude.
II. ELECTORAL PROBABILITY AND
SUSCEPTIBILITY
In our model let there be M swing states having elec-
toral vote values {Nj} and winning probabilities for can-
didate A of {pj}, for j = 1 . . .M . Consider a partition to
be defined as a set of integers {i1 . . . iM}, with ij = 0, 1.
The probability of a partition is
p(i1 . . . iM ) =
M∏
j=1
p
ij
j (1− pj)1−ij (3)
and the probability of candidate A winning an election
that requires Nw electoral votes from the swing states is
then:
E(Nw) =
∑
i1,...,iM=0,1
p(i1 . . . iM )θ(
M∑
j=1
ijNj −Nw) (4)
Let sj be the number of additional votes for A acquired
in state j, expressed in terms of equivalent electoral votes.
We are interested in computing the following quantity
which we define as the Electoral Susceptibility (ES)
χj ≡ ∂E(Nw)
∂sj
=
∂E(Nw)
∂pj
∂pj
∂sj
(5)
The first factor will turn out to measure an unormalized
combinatoric increase in E with inclusion of state j. The
second factor is dominant when the probabilities pj devi-
ate strongly from 1/2 and the state j is no longer strictly
a swing state. To express the susceptibility, note that
E(Nw) may always be written in terms of conditional
probabilities based upon state j:
E(Nw) = pjEj(Nw −Nj) + (1 − pj)Ej(Nw) (6)
where Ej(K) is the probability of winning K electoral
votes without state j. Therefore
χj = (Ej(Nw −Nj)− Ej(Nw))∂pj
∂sj
(7)
It is now seen that the first factor encodes the correlations
that are present for a particular Nw by measuring how
many additional winning partitions are available with the
inclusion of state j.
NH
CO
VA
WI NC
MI
OH
IANV
FL
NH
CO
VA
WI
NC
MI
OH
IA
NV
FL
FIG. 1. (Color online) Electoral susceptibilities, χj , for
Nw = 49 and pj = 1/2 displayed in relative terms (outer
pie). The small differences between the states reflect interac-
tions, or correlations between their appearance in the set of
winning partitions. Electoral susceptibility without normal-
ization, ∂E/∂pj(= Njχj), displayed in relative terms (inner
pie.)
To complete the evaluation of this expression we must
consider how the individual state probabilities, {pj} are
formed from polling data. For example, If candidate A
is ahead in state j by xj = 0.06 (6%), a reasonable prob-
ability distribution for candidate A’s fractional lead, x,
given polling variance, σ2j is the distribution:
p˜j(x) =
1√
2piσ2j
exp(−1
2
(x− xj)2
σ2j
) (8)
The probability, pj , of candidate A winning state j is
then
pj = 〈1〉+ ≡
∫ ∞
0
p˜j(x)dx (9)
3pj = 1/2
State χj χj/
∑
Florida 0.0154 0.107
Nevada 0.01530 0.106
Iowa 0.01530 0.106
Ohio 0.01487 0.103
Michigan 0.01477 0.102
North Carolina 0.01445 0.100
Wisconsin 0.01426 0.099
Virginia 0.01367 0.095
Colorado 0.01324 0.092
New Hampshire 0.01318 0.091
TABLE I. Electoral susceptibilities, χj , for Nw = 49 and pj =
1/2. Despite the large differences in the number of electoral
votes for each state, the susceptibilities are all very close in
value to each other. However, the residual variations in χj
between states reflect interactions or correlations between two
or more states’ appearance in the set of winning partitions
The additional acquired electoral votes, sj , effect a
shift in xj → xj + δxj , where δxj = sj/Nj . It is pos-
sible to show that
∂pj
∂sj
|sj=0 =
1
Njσ2j
〈x− xj〉+ (10)
When state j is a pure swing state (xj = 0), 〈x−xj〉+ =
σj/
√
2pi; the ES may then be compactly written
χj =
1√
2pi
(Ej(Nw −Nj)− Ej(Nw)) αj
Njσj
(11)
The coefficient αj ≡
√
2pi〈x − xj〉+/σj has a maximum
value of unity and expresses the reduction of the ES as
the probability of winning state j deviates from 1/2.
When αj = 1 (pure swing state) we see that the sus-
ceptibility is ”normalized” by a factor 1/Nj. This is (con-
stitutionally) reassuring in that we expect the impact of
a state on the winning probability, ∂E/∂pj, to be propor-
tional to Nj so that the election is ”fair,” at least in the
limit of an infinite electoral college. Thus the susceptibil-
ity as defined is an electoral per capita susceptibility and
should be approximately constant by the central limit
theorem. We demonstrate this feature in the next sec-
tion when computing the susceptibilities for the electoral
college when pj = 1/2.
It is interesting to note that the susceptibility χj, for
state j, is identical for both candidates even if Nw is very
small or large (a ”one-sided” contest), and even if states
deviate strongly from pure swing state (pj = 1/2) status.
Denoting the candidate A (B) susceptibility and prob-
ability, χ
A(B)
j and E
A(B), respectively, it can be shown
that
χBj =
∂EB
∂pBj
∂pBj
∂sj
=
∂EA
∂pAj
∂pBj
∂sj
(12)
Obama
State χj χj/
∑
Ohio 0.161 0.141
Virginia 0.159 0.139
Nevada 0.155 0.136
Iowa 0.138 0.121
Wisconsin 0.117 0.103
Colorado 0.109 0.095
New Hampshire 0.095 0.083
Florida 0.087 0.076
North Carolina 0.063 0.055
Michigan 0.058 0.051
TABLE II. Electoral susceptibilities (Obama), χj for ten
swing states comprising 126 electoral votes. The largest three
susceptibility states (Ohio (18) , Virginia (13) and Nevada
(6)) include a big, medium, and small electoral count state,
showing the effects of interactions between states.
because EB(pBj ) = 1−EA(1−pBj ). The second factor in
the equation above, ∂pBj /∂sj, defined in equation (10),
may be shown to be equal to its A counterpart by noting
that 〈x− xj〉+ = 〈x + xj〉+.
Actually, this argument is only strictly correct with
an odd number of swing state electoral votes, that is, a
swing state contest with no possible tie. When the total
electoral count, NT , is even (as it is in the example of
section IV) there is a slight asymmetry in that if Nw is
the winning swing state electoral count for the Democrat,
NT −Nw + 1 is the winning swing state electoral count
for the Republican.
One might also consider a higher rank susceptibility
that encodes correlations or synergy between states: how
is the susceptibility of state i affected by a change in prob-
ability of state j. Considering only the equal probability
case (pj = 1/2) and using the same analysis leading to
equations (6,7), the variation δχi/δpj given by:
∂2E
∂pi∂pj
= [Eij(Nw −Ni −Nj)− Eij(Nw)]
− [Eij(Nw −Ni)− Eij(Nw −Nj)] (13)
where Eij(N) is the probability of achieving N electoral
votes without either state i or j. The first line represents
the combinatoric increase in eliminating states i and j;
the second line subtracts off the combinatoric increases
with the exclusion of each state leaving only the effect of
the correlation between states i and j.
Within the thermodynamic analogy discussed above,
χij is the correlation function between state i and state
j. The eigenvectors of χij corresponding to large eigen-
values may be thought of as describing a set of states
which contribute synergistically to either increasing or
decreasing the probability of winning. Computational
studies of this quantity are in progress at the time of this
manuscript.
4Romney
State χj χj/
∑
Ohio 0.159 0.150
Virginia 0.154 0.145
Wisconsin 0.116 0.109
New Hampshire 0.116 0.109
Nevada 0.115 0.108
Colorado 0.104 0.098
Iowa 0.104 0.097
Florida 0.081 0.076
Michigan 0.058 0.054
North Carolina 0.057 0.054
TABLE III. Electoral susceptibilities (Romney), χj for ten
swing states comprising 126 electoral votes. The largest three
susceptibility states (Ohio (18) , Virginia (13) and Wisconsin
(10)) include a big, medium, and a relatively small electoral
count state, showing the effects of interactions between states.
III. RESULTS FOR A pj = 1/2 ELECTORAL
COLLEGE.
The susceptibility χj has been computed for a model
with ten swing states (listed in Table (I)) and Nw = 49,
corresponding to a common electoral scenario for the
Democratic candidate entering the swing state electoral
contest. The inner chart of Figure 1 show the unnormal-
ized susceptibilities ∂E/∂pj for all of the states in the
model. As expected, their shares are closely proportional
to their electoral counts, Nj . The normalized suscepti-
bilities, χj , shown in the outer chart, roughly equalizes
the individual state shares.
However close inspection of Table I shows that they
are not exactly the same, the largest three being Florida,
Nevada and Iowa. These differences are a consequence of
the subtle correlations between states present in the set of
winning partitions. For instance, even though Nevada (6)
and New Hampshire (4) are of similar size, Nevada works
cooperatively with more states and appears in more win-
ning partitions (those with a vote total of Nw = 49 or
more). Similarly, even though Ohio and Florida are the
largest states, Ohio appears with a higher frequency in
the winning partitions. The presence of a correlation
between two states that effects the states’ susceptibility,
χj , depends very much upon Nw, a feature we attempt
to explore analytically in section V.
IV. RESULTS FOR ELECTORAL COLLEGE
2012
Using aggregate polling data assembled at the
FiveThirtyEight Blog from the beginning of October
2012 [2], we have computed the electoral susceptibilities
{χj} of ten swing states. Specifically, the polling per-
centages for candidates and their variances are used in
equation (8), which determine the probability, pj, and
parameter, αj , for state j.
Table II, first column, shows the electoral suscepti-
bilities for President Obama listed in descending order.
Switching the voter equivalent of one electoral vote in the
state of Ohio has the largest effect on his re-election prob-
ability compared with any other state. It is significant to
note that Virginia and Nevada have susceptibilities that
are nearly as large even though (especially Nevada) they
represent much smaller electoral shares. The second col-
umn of Table II is the same data normalized to sum to
unity; this data is displayed in Figure (2) to illustrate the
relative impact of the ten swing states. Again, the inner
pie of Figure (2) shows the unnormalized susceptibilities
which reflect the relative electoral vote contribution of
state j, Nj , but not the effect of changing a fixed num-
ber of votes.
Table III and Figure (3) show the same analysis for
Governor Romney. Note that the susceptibilities for
Obama and Romney are close but not exactly identical;
this effect, mentioned in section II, is a consequence of
an even number (126) of electoral swing state votes.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Electoral susceptibility (Obama), χj ,
for state j displayed in relative terms (outer pie). Electoral
susceptibility without normalization, Njχj , for state j dis-
played in relative terms (inner pie.)
V. ZIPF MODEL
Consider a model in which states with lower electoral
counts are more numerous than states with higher elec-
toral count. We assume the states follow a Zipf distri-
bution: there is a single state with electoral count N0,
two states with electoral count N0/2; four states with
electoral count N0/4, etc. Denoting by Lk the num-
ber of states at level k, and Nk the electoral value of
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Electoral susceptibility (Romney) χj
for state j displayed in relative terms (outer pie). Electoral
susceptibility without normalization, Njχj , for state j dis-
played in relative terms (inner pie.)
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Electoral susceptibility χk for a state
at level k = 0(◦), 1(⊓), 2(⋄), 3(△).
states at level k the Zipf distribution is: Lk = 2
k and
Nk = (1/2)
kN0. Let qk be the number of states won
at level k. The probability of achieving a particular set
{qk}, analogous to equation (3) is
p({qk}) = 1
2Ω
∏
k
BLkqk (14)
where Ω =
∑
k Lk is the total number of states and B
n
m =
n!
m!(n−m)! i is the binomial coefficient. The probability of
a candidate achieving the winning number of votes, Nw,
or more (analogous to equation (4)) is:
E(Nw) =
∑
{qk}
p({qk})θ(
∑
k
qkNk −Nw) (15)
For a model with four levels, the susceptibility of a
state in level k, χk, is shown in Figure 4. Small Nw cor-
responds to a ”one-sided” election where one candidate
enters the swing state contest needing only a small num-
ber of votes to win, in this case Nw << 32, the total
number of electoral votes. For Nw ∼ 1, it is possible
to show that χk ∝ 1/Nk. As the election tends towards
an ”even” contest, Nw ≈ 16, the susceptibilities becomes
approximately constant χk ≈ 1/Nw (independent of k
except for k = 0) and ∂E/∂pk ≈ Nk/Nw.
For one-sided electoral contests, Figure 4 shows that
small electoral count states have the largest susceptibili-
ties; as the contest becomes more even, the largest elec-
toral count state becomes dominant with all other states
tending toward equal susceptibilities. Figure 5, which
normalizes the susceptibility of a state at level k with
that of level k = 0 illustrates this trend.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Electoral susceptibility ratio χk/χ0
for a state at level k. This is the susceptibility normalized
with respect to the susceptibility of the single highest electoral
count state.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Electoral Susceptibility χj is roughly a measure
of where campaign capital to change votes should be
spent to maximize the probability of winning the elec-
tion. Our analysis points to subtle correlations between
the frequency of states’ appearances in the set of win-
ning partitions of the electoral college which is not easily
intuited.
From the analysis of the hierarchical Zipf model (sec-
tion V) it is seen that in close swing state electoral con-
tests, the largest state has the largest susceptibility, and
in ”one-sided” contests small states have the highest sus-
ceptibilities.
The latter effect may be partially understood simply
by looking at the dependence of the winning probability,
E(Nw), upon the average state size in electoral votes.
For instance in the example given in the introduction of
ten swing states, the ratio of the number of Democrat
winning partitions to Republican winning partitions was
6741/283 ≈ 2.62. The ratio of winning electoral votes
(Republican/Democrat) was 79/49 ≈ 1.61. If the elec-
tion were an ”even” electoral contest, both ratios would
be unity. The proliferation of winning to losing partitions
compared with the ratio of electoral votes is a reflection
of the number of relatively small states giving rise to
large number of winning combinations for the candidate
(the Democrat in this case) who enters the swing state
electoral contest in the lead. Consider the extreme ex-
ample: a candidate needing only 5 electoral votes would
much prefer an electoral college having 20 states carry-
ing 1 vote apiece than an electoral college having 5 states
carrying 4 votes apiece. Small states are more valuable
per capita because they carry a larger per capita entropy.
However the situation is more complex in the realistic,
highly inhomogeneous, electoral college. Even in the pj =
1/2 equal probability case, several large and small states
have comparable susceptibilities. The 49 votes needed by
the Democratic candidate corresponds to neither a close
nor ”one-sided” electoral contest. Also, from the analysis
above it is not obvious why the susceptibilities are exactly
the same for the leading and trailing candidate.
Lastly, we mention how this calculation might be im-
proved for a realistic campaign. It is well known that
one electoral vote is equivalent to a different number of
voters in different states. (For up to date demographics
see reference [4].) This correspondence needs to be folded
through our derivative leading to equation 10.
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[1] The parameter, sj , corresponds to population equivalent
to one electoral vote in state j. Of course, the demograph-
ics of the electoral college system make the population
equivalent to one electoral vote different in every state.
Our calculation could be easily modified to include this
effect.
[2] See discussions of ”Return on Investment” In the
FiveThirtyEight Blog by Nate Silver: fivethir-
tyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/. As the FiveThirtyEight
Blog algorithm is not public, we are unsure how Electoral
Susceptibility relates to Return on Investment.
[3] For a perspective on how a single vote affects
an election see: ”Am I decisive,” W. Mebane,
http://www-personal.umich.edu/∼wmebane/fall99/gov317/pdecisive.pdf.
[4] wikipedia.org/wiki/File:State population per electoral vote.png
